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THE NEW ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE LAW
Luis Martinez-Calcerrada*
INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN

For this legal interchange between the state of Louisiana and
Spain it is important to note that two years ago in our country the
privileges or preferences which husbands still enjoyed with respect
to their wives were abolished. This statement, however, must be qualified as a half-truth, for although it is clear that under our former
laws those privileges were certain, it is also clear that for quite a
long time a series of reforms incorporated into our Civil Code has
progressively equalized both spouses to the point where equality is
today the norm. To clarify this "half-truth" would require a detailed
examination of all the areas in which the law distinguished between
husband and wife, as well as a study of their Hispanic origin and a
realization that much of Spanish law was assimilated from French civil
law.
This work, however, will attempt to take into account only the
legal obligations of women, using as a point of departure a series of
situations in which women find themselves or have found themselves
assuming functions or responsibilities different from those of men.
Some of these fall more naturally to women than to men, while others,
perhaps, have been imposed or accepted without analysis. The logical
goal is to learn in what manner the law has influenced "how women
are or have been." This work will examine the different spheres in
which women appear unequal to men and will indicate the different
roles of women and the changes in those roles. The final view to
emerge will be that of women under current law.
Without exhausting the historic sources of the problem-since
history is not the focus of this study-one may glean from the important work of Don Jos6 CastAn on the social and legal condition of
women, written in 1955, the following conclusion: that, as is known,
the original view of women, now condemned, was that they were held
to be so lacking in certain physical and mental qualities as to be called
"the weaker sex." From this it developed that the mere fact' of their
natural femininity gave women certain characteristics that caused
them to be considered from a legal standpoint as an object or person
having an inferior legal status.
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Under the primitive social systems regulated by patriarchal
regimes, women were in a servile position, subject to male power,
or were placed under masculine guardianship. Vestiges of these
systems are found both in ancient Roman and ancient Germanic law.
It was Christianity, with its belief in the sanctity of matrimony, in
equality and liberty for human beings, which contributed decisively
to the importance of women within the family and society. In the final
period of the Roman law, on which Christianity had already exerted
an influence, and under the jus commune, there were certainly fewer
limitations upon women than those imposed by private law, in spite
of the fact that the principle of women's legal incapacity was maintained under the public law.
As in many other areas of the law, and as affirmed by Professor
CastAn, the sixteenth-century principle of the incapacity of married
women passed into the French Civil Code of 1804, quite significantly,
despite the Revolution in France which was based upon such progressive ideas as the dogma of individualism. Also consecrated in that
code were the results flowing from the principle of marital power,
as great in the personal sphere as in the patrimonial. From the second half of the nineteenth century up to our time, however, the new
currents of equality between the sexes have been ingrained in the
major civil laws and have become the basis for its codification. In
sum, the status of married women became stronger and stronger
through the years, and if some inequities did persist, the most recent
legislative reforms have abolished them. Finally, in the area of public
law, this doctrine of equality has gained ground so that women are
able to assume the same duties or public offices as men.
Such an historical review indicates an up-hill battle for women
who, by reason of their being the "weaker sex," were subjected in
legal matters to the authority of their fathers or husbands. Through
this evolution an end was put to the legal inferiority of women, which
had resulted in greater opportunities being granted to men. Assuming that legislators had reasons which, in their day, were valid for
according unfavorable treatment to women, one cannot possibly determine the origin of the discrimination historically accorded women
without undertaking a study of the differences existing between men
and women, not just from a biological point of view, but also by considering the role or status which men and women have had in society
and within the family. This threefold view is important because,
although the principle of legal equality of the sexes is an uncontestable
reality, major differences between them still persist in political, social,
and family life.
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Physiological Differences Between the Sexes and Their Legal
Implications
In regard to the personal qualities of men and women, one must
first consider all of their indisputable biological differences and
likenesses, joining to them the closely related matter of procreation,
since the concepts of maternity and paternity have accounted for certain rules of inequality within the law. Considering the psyche, intelligence, intuition, will, and psychological attitude of the sexes, it
is clear that men are not necessarily superior to women. And, even
though there are physical differences between them, particularly in
regard to physical strength, one must admit that such is not necessarily a basis for asserting the legal inferiority of women. But, even
though such superiority is non-existent, the dictates of legislative
politics throughout the ages and among the various nations have taken
advantage of the existence of certain differences between the sexes,
and the scale has always been tipped in favor of men on the basis
that such differences gave rise to the so-called inferiority of women.
Sociological Implications and Influences
Perhaps more interesting in a legal study, if not more important,
is a consideration of how men, and women fit into society and how
they are affected by the various social institutions as a result of the
differences in their sexes and in their roles. Regardless of what period
is examined, the point of reference is always a social structure created
by men for men. The "rules of the game" are unilaterally imposed
and are therefore established for those who instituted them. In this
sense, the rules are addressed to women who are, nevertheless, always
viewed as "inferior," as "objects" relied upon for the comfort and use
of those in control of the game. As a result of this self-oriented structure, men tend to make the choices, while women have accepted the
duties imposed upon them, perhaps because of their natural adaptability for such duties, which have primarily related to maternal and
domestic functions. It is important, also, to point out that even in
contemporary society, there persist numerous examples of these structures centered around the interests of men.
Customs, traditions,and social trends. Customs, traditions, and
social trends constitute assimilated social rules which distinguish one
group of people from another. Although all three are spontaneously
and subconsciously integrated and practiced by the members of a
societal group, it is clear that there is a difference where men and
women are concerned. Perhaps the most important aspect of this difference is in the roles of the sexes, with men assuming an exterior
role, that is, with their being the principal actors in the theater of
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society, while women are placed in an interior role, inside the home,
with no possibility of approaching the social "exterior."
If one examines the causes for this dicotomy, bearing in mind the
substantial biological similarity between the two sexes, and therefore
their similar initial aptitude, it is difficult to understand why this situation has arisen. Considering all possible reasons, including the greater
physical strength of men and the placement of women with regard
to the family or their domestic tasks clearly this dicotomy must be
related to women's feelings of subordination resulting from their secondary roles as imposed by such customs, traditions, and trends of
society. Even today, a glance at life in certain sections of southern
Spain reveals marriages in which only the husband works and amuses
himself outside of the home, while his wife remains a recluse, performing the often thankless tasks of rearing children and serving her
spouse.
Morals. The term "morals" must be taken to mean the set of
ethical values that shapes the general conduct of the members of the
social group, as well as a reality that is deeply felt and ingrained
in the conscience of man, and by which such conduct is qualified as
moral or immoral. It is clear that morality as a concept, which goes
beyond the individual and comprises a diversity of religious sentiments, good customs, and other personal virtues rooted in society,
has varied with the times and among different societies. Obviously,
moral values are not the same in a rustic, underpopulated region as
in a large metropolitan center, nor are they the same in the twentieth century as they were in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, if there
is one thing which clearly characterizes the value judgments that
result from the concept of morals, it is the severity with which women
are judged as compared to men. It is as if more is demanded of women
in adhering to the rules, whereas there is a greater permissiveness,
or tolerance, in regard to the actions of men. For instance, certain
feudal or partriarchal privileges, such as having a concubine or several
spouses, have been considered moral with respect to men, but not
women. Although the evolution toward equal expectations of the sexes
in terms of moral conduct has reduced the disparity in defining immoral conduct for men and women, there still remains a tendency
toward granting greater justification or explanation for male transgressors than for female ones.
Employment and social development. It is clear, and is generally
accepted, that until very recent times women have not been part of
the employment world, understanding that term to mean the rendering of services to another for adequate compensation. It is well known
that women in the past were separated from the area of rendering
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services and from the exercise of any profession, art, or task of any
influence in the community. Since women were relegated to domestic
tasks for which they were financially uncompensated, there was never
any specific recognition of their usefulness to society. Thus, in the
employment world, as in other areas, women have been given the
secondary role of supporter in regard to men, the main workers.
With their liberation, at least in theory, women have gained fulfillment in the employment world, although in practice there still exist
areas or professions which are not open to them. Nevertheless, there
is evidence of a backlash because it is felt that part of the problem
of unemployment is attributable to the fact that many positions are
now held by women rather than by men who have families to support. In spite of all this, there is one major certainty: the true liberation of women must begin with their actual incorporation into the
work force. From there, women can obtain not only social and economic
independence, but also recognition of their valuable contribution to
the, progress of their communities.
Overcoming social discrimination.The picture arrived at on the
basis of the preceding social analysis is certainly a negative one. In
society and elsewhere, women find themselves discriminated against
in relation to men, because of the role that they occupy or are assigned
is always an inferior one. It would appear that it is very difficult for
men to give up their primary position, and thus that the factual role
of women is somewhat different from that accorded them under the
law. The evolutionary process in this regard is symptomatic-the more
a society progresses or develops, the higher the standard of living
for its members becomes. Thus, as the standard of living improves,
women begin to play role similar to those of men. This becomes evident if one compares the greater liberation of women characteristic
of industrialized countries with the inferior situation of their counterparts in underdeveloped countries. Such a correlation may be due,
perhaps, to the fact that in such liberalized societies, the male
establishment is already so saturated with power or well-being that
it tends to make more concessions. This may also be due to the fact
that the very encouragement of cultural, scientific, and spiritual
developments in the more advanced countries produces a less submissive women who succeeds in achieving greater participation in'
society by means of protest. and rebellion. Whatever the reason for
the discrimination between the sexes, it is clear that the movement
toward liberation and equality should not stop at the point of legal
equality. If the views and value judgments regarding women remain
the same, legislation can do very little, but it is important to begin
with legal change, for only then will the slow process of breaking
down rigid beliefs being.
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The Family
The single women. The question of whether or not the single
woman is dependent on some sort of family authority can only be
considered with respect to modern times. In ancient times, this question of independence was irrelevant, for in all cases women were
limited in their capacity because of their sex. If a woman remained
single, this incapacity caused her to be under a life-long guardianship. That notion, however, was abolished under the law of Justinian.
Subsequent legal developments, which accompanied social progress,
do permit one to examine the status of single women within the family
for an indication of changes in their level of autonomy. To accomplish
this, one must look to the single woman's different roles and interrelationship with man.
The dependent single woman is one who lives within the family
circle under the authority of the family head. Such a woman may or
may not be a minor, and she may or may not be the daughter of
the family head. The question to be examined in this respect is
whether or not the dependent single woman had equal status with
the dependent man living in an analogous situation. As a general rule,
the orientation of the family differed according to the sex of the child.
The girls were expected to stay home and engage in domestic or
household tasks and were given only an elementary or artistic or
musical education. The boys, on the other hand, were expected to
dedicate themselves to studies outside the home and to mixing with
others, for this would enable them to function as family head and to
support their families later on. In terms of restrictions and punishment with respect to behavior, the stamp of sexual discrimination reappears. The single dependent woman was more controlled and protected, with the single dependent male being given greater freedom
with regard to his activities and choice of friends. When a woman's
actions caused the personal or family honor to be at stake, that conduct was viewed with greater distain and was punished more severely
than if a male family member had engaged in the same conduct. The
women's liberation movement has definitely reduced these inequities
in the way society judges the actions of men and women, and educational opportunities for women are more closely approximating those
of men.
The independent single woman is one who is autonomous, that
is, a woman who by herself constitutes a family unit, has her own
financial resources, and is emmancipated. In modern societies this
situation is becoming more and more common, whether the woman's
resources derive from her own inheritance or from her employment.
Since such a woman is free of family domination, her conduct will
be judged by values different from those for the single dependent
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woman. It should be noted also that a single independent woman can
live with a man without losing her single status, thus creating, whether
or not there are children of that union, a "de facto" family. In any
case, the single independent woman becomes a part of society and
will be exposed to the discriminatory pressures discussed in the
preceding section.
The married woman. If, as has been pointed out, the single woman
(whether or not she is free of family authority), suffers apparent prejudices because of her unequal status with men, when such a woman
marries, her new conjugal status does not offer her any additional
freedom or any greater recognition of her rights, but instead plunges
her into new depths of inequality and discrimination. It is clear, in
legal terms, and especially from an historical point of view, that just
as the single woman endures a generic incapacity because of her sex,
the married woman is weighed down with an additional incapacity
specifically because of her marital status. A reasonable person might
well ask how the single woman who, by marrying, frees herself of
paternal power and thus emancipates herself according to law, rather
than acquiring greater freedom, finds herself in a new state of
dependence or family slavery. The answer lies in the fact that such
a woman simply changes from being dependent on her father, the
titular holder of authority, to being dependent on a new family head,
in the person of her husband. Things have changed, of course, although
not to such an extent that one should believe that this pathology has
been absolutely eraticated. This view of women can be examined in
light of the following discussion of its different aspects.
The historical precedents of this problem appear in great profusion in the writings of jurists studying the influence of marriage on
capacity. This is naturally so, since marriage forms the nucleus of
the family and the basic unit of society. Under ancient Roman law,
which declined in the fourth century A.D., the woman in a traditional
marriage formed part of the husband's family and was subject to his
domestic control, If the husband was a son still living with his own
family, then his wife was subject to the authority of the paterfamilias.
In either case, the wife did not have the capacity to contract or to
incur obligations. Although under Germanic law marriage was
regarded as a unit over which the husband had control and for which
the husband acted as representative, the woman, because of her
domestic talents, was granted some rights of representation.
With the passage of time, this situation of total dependence for
women gradually weakened, and an awareness and recognition of their
conjugal position evolved, even in ancient times. The full range of
powers held by the husband were limited by custom. The recognition
of the respect and consideration owed to the wife's family acted as
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a rein on possible abuses of the marital power, apart from the implicit
dignity of the woman as wife and mater familias. Briefly, this postancient evolution can be described as follows.
Under the laws of the Roman Republic, the decline of the husband's marital powers over his wife began. A wife was not formally
endowed with a general incapacity, yet there were very specific prohibitions on her ability to obligate herself. For example, she was prohibited from acting as a surety for her husband. Christianity brought
about a certain backsliding in the recognition of the married woman's
autonomy. By carefully consecrating the values of the institution of
matrimony and preservation of the harmony of its members, the
Church attributed the function of superintendent or manager to the
husband, with the result that the secondary role went to the wife.
Nevertheless, the wife was accorded the dignity and respect due all
individuals.
Medieval law attempted to retain the influence of the Christian
values in regard to recognizing the married woman as a person and
perpetuating her lack of capacity in legal matters, since she remained
under her husband's control. Thus, there evolved under medieval law
the principle that a married women had no economic capacity. Even
if the married woman did have legal capacity within the personal
sphere, she was denied this capacity in regard to her patrimony. The
codification movement did not substantially change this inferior position for the married woman, and even the French Civil Code, dating
from the early part of the last century, reinforced and intensified the
principle of the incapacity of the married woman, despite the fact that
it incorporated other liberal ideas stemming from the Revolution. This
situation continued up until the most recent legislative reforms of the
present century.
Social significance of marriage. This transmission of power to
which a married woman was subject, first to the power of her family
and then to that of her husband, and even in some cases her husband's father, must be explained with reference to the social value
attributed to marriage. Marriage has always been an institution whose
origins are lost in history. It has been of transcendental importance
for society itself, which has imposed upon it certain rites and liturgical
forms, generally of a religious character. It can be shown that of all
the institutions regulated by law, the oldest for which a solemn form
was prescribed was marriage. Thus, in a majority of nations, marriage has been endowed with a certain sacred character and special
rites have been established for its celebration.
Speaking in social terms, it is unquestionable that during much
of history marriage was conceived of as a business between the
families involved, and its economic consequences were the most im-
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portant consideration. Even in recent times, the economic motivation,
this need to protect the family fortune, so to speak. has been of
primary importance, for it is clear that, in general, families prefer
that the spouse chosen by an offspring have a substantial economic
status.
In ancient Rome, such a monetary motivation created the situation in which a wife was bought by a husband, with this practice ending only when slaves became the principal workers and women were
no longer a factor in producing food, goods, or services, but were instead supported by their husbands. In fact, a woman in effect bought
her husband, for she had to provide him with a dowry. It is clear
that in both instances the husband's interests were of primary importance. Since the husband had to support his wife, he incorporated her
into his legal and economic sphere. With this obligation, the management of any income which the wife acquired naturally became the
husband's responsibility. Thus, it is easy to understand the evolution
of the husband as being preeminent and the wife as secondary. Since
it was the husband who worked and supported the wife, naturally
he had the right within the family to impose his own rules upon her.
Experience demonstrates that, in those modern marriages where both
spouses work and support the family, the right to impose such rules
does not belong exclusively to the husband, but is distributed between
the spouses.
Domestic position of the married woman. The discussions of the
concept of work within this paper are not intended to imply that the
traditional domestic duties of wives do not constitute work, for they
do; however, such duties, with their diverse connotations, always seem
to operate to the detriment of women. Their domestic work is not
remunerated, so a wife does not contribute in a tangible way to the
family resources and therefore cannot present "credentials" which
would entitle them to an economic power comparable to that of their
husbands' within the family. Nor' does their work have an influence
on society, and it is therefore improper to say that such work assists
or aid society's progress and development. Finally, such domestic work
does not distinguish the wife in the eyes of the community, since it
occurs only in her home surroundings, and even there her services
often go unappreciated.
Modern law and recent reforms refer prompously to "domestic
power" or to the "power of the keys" which the married woman has.
The purpose of such terminology is to grant to married women a certain autonomy or independence with respect to the dominant authority
that their husbands have within the family. But what is the "domestic
power" which women have? The inappropriateness of the term is the
same as if one were to maintain that in order to protect a debtor
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one should declare him to be in charge of his own debt! The married
woman's duties included rearing and caring for the needs of the
children, tending to the physical and everyday needs of her husband,
treating him with an attitude of reverence and respect, undertaking
rather unattractive manual tasks, such as cleaning, washing, and ironing, and performing such chores outside the home as transporting the
children to school, grocery shopping, and purchasing other necessities.
It is only in this latter instance that the previously mentioned
autonomy of the married woman comes into play.
One thing is clear amid this complex series of tasks-there is a
certain ingratitude associated with them, for they are indeed a
nuisance. Additionally, these chores are given negligible economic and
social recognition, to the extent that being a paid domestic servant
is one of the lowliest forms of employment in society. Not only are
those who engage in this type of work the least endowed economically
and culturally, but they are also given an inferior status legally. For
instance, domestic work is excluded from standard labor law in Spain.
In spite of all this, however, the married woman does make indisputable, valuable contributions, and these should be recognized and
taken into account in the reevaluation of the married woman's activities. In addition to the vital assistance which she provides to her husband and children, a nobel mission, she also participates in the family
savings and contributes to the family economy. A married woman accomplishes this through her administration of the expenses of daily
life and by providing domestic services for the family, which implies
a financial gain, since domestic workers would otherwise have to be
hired to perform those duties. As will be discussed in more detail
below, legislators are now beginning to take note of this phenomenon
and have begun to assign an economic value, to the domestic work
performed by the wife, so that its social relevance can be appreciated
and the wife's contributions can no longer be minimized by the
husband.
The so-called conjugal fidelity. Early in this century, article 105
of the Spanish Civil Code stated that a legitimate cause for divorce,
among others, was "adultery on the part of a wife in all cases, and'
on the part of her husband when the result was a public scandal or
disdain for the wife." With the reforms made in 1958, that article
was changed so that adultery on the part of either one of the spouses
was a sufficient cause for separation. Today, under Law of July 7,
1981, article 82 of the Civil Code, regarding separation, states that
"marital infidelty" is a cause for separation. It is thus clear that conjugal fidelity is of primary importance among the reciprocal duties
of the spouses, since the Civil Code itself establishes such fidelity as
a reflections of the personal content of marraige. But, as in so many

1982]

NEW ROLE of WOMEN

1549

other areas of marriage and family law, the legislator does (and should
do) nothing but record reality as it exists within the family and society.
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
The final stage in which differences between the sexes will be
compared is in the legal realm. It must be emphasized that, unfortunately, the disparity between reality as it is affected by morals,
society, and the family, and the norm as it appears in the law has
not been totally harmonized. In most countries the social reality of
women's liberation and equality of the sexes has antedated legislative
evolution and reform, where change is usually very slow.
Comparative Law
As indicated above, sociological precedents have influenced the
legal status of women in all legislations of the civilized world. Certainly the trend toward equating the status of men and women began
to acquire significance in the first decade of this century, when people in most civilized countries began to perceive the necessity of changing the basis for much traditional legislation concerning women's
rights. The feminist movement, which began shortly before World War
I and reappeared with more intensity in World War II, suggested
to constitutionalists the need to look, not only at the rights of the
individual, but also at those relating to the family, to marriage, and
to the equalization of the sexes. To gain an overview of the comparative law in this area one can consider international law and the
legislation from a number of countries.
The internationalcommunity of nations. In the founding charter
of the United Nations (1945), the principle of equality of rights for
both sexes was clearly included, along with a condemnation of any
distinction by reason of sex. The Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
in articles 2 and 5, reaffirms this legal equality. The United Nations
Subcommission on the Legal and Social Condition of Women has
aspired to improving the position of women until it is equal to that
of men in all human endeavors. In this effort the subcommission sent
a series of recommendations to the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations and the latter, in turn, has approved the following resolutions.
Resolution of July 23, 1953 recommended that governments adopt
all measures possible in order to guarantee the equality of rights and
duties of husbands and wives in matters relating to the family and
all measures possible in order to guarantee married women full legal
capacity, the right to work outside the home, and the right, in a manner equal to their husbands, to acquire, administer, realize income
from, and dispose of property. Based on the belief that the matrimonial
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regimes of many countries were contrary to the principle of equality
between the spouses, both during and at the termination of the marriage, Resolution of December 12, 1954 contained the recommendation that all member states take every action necessary in order to
assure that all discrimination measures in their legislation be eliminated. In Resolution of August 3, 1955, it was recommended that
governments adopt all means necessary to guarantee a wife the right
to have an independent domicile. The Resolutions of August 3, 1955
and March 20, 1965 called for cessation of the requirement that marriage automatically affected or changed the wife's domicile and recommended that the member states adopt all measures necessary to insure
that parents would have equal rights and obligations with respect to
their children. With respecct to these resolutions adopted by the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations as a basis for the
more specific proposals elaborated by the Subcommission on the Legal
and Social Condition of Women, it is important to emphasize the following pertinent conclusions on which those resolutions and proposals
were founded.
The problem of social and legal discrimination against women
became so acute in all countries of the international community following the Second World War that the United Nations itself felt the need
for a subcommission to deal with this issue and to exhort member
nations to eradicate such discrimination. Just as with the problem
of children born of illicit sexual relations, it became necessary in the
case of discrimination against women to direct a series of questions
to member states. As a result, the following legal criteria which denied
women equality were revealed:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

That women did not share with men certain rights and
obligations in relation to their families and their spouses;
That the women actually lacked legal capacity;
That they were not duly guaranteed their right to work
outside the home;
That they could not, under equal conditions with their
husbands, acquire, administer, have the usufruct of, or
dispose of family property;
That in many countries a wife had no rights in regard to
community property, and even with respect to her
separate property;
That a wife often could not have a domicile independent
from that of her husband nor could she maintain her own
nationality if different from that of her husband;
That authority over the children was exercised exclusively
by the husband.

Since these discriminatory practices grossly contradicted the Charter
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of the United Nations, and specifically the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the previously mentioned recommendations corresponding to future legislative reforms were suggested.
Obviously the level of discriminatory treatment for women was
not, nor is it now, uniform. Naturally, the more progressive and advanced societies have enjoyed and do enjoy a more equitable legal
situation, while more traditional societies remain anchored to obsolete
regulations clearly prejudicial to women. Nonetheless, because of the
promulgation of the UN recommendations, and no doubt because of
the growing pressure of femminist movements, the political trend has
clearly been toward legal equalization of the sexes, which now widely
appears in statutes and codes. Of course, as has been pointed out,
putting these changes into 'effect is a slower process, one which
depends upon deep-rooted social and family habits.
Foreign legislation. The legislative details of every country are,
of course, beyond the scope of this paper, although it should be noted
the differences in the various legal criteria do exist. Thus, in addition
to the preceding international panorama, a series of the most positive
national laws has been selected to complete the picture of women and
their relationship to men on a comparative law basis.
At the beginning of this century, Roguin classified the legislations
of various countries with respect to the civil capacity of married
women into the following groups: (1) guardianship of married women
was in force in the Scandinavian countries; (2) the need for the husband's authorization in order to act, and independent of the matrimonial regime between the spouses, was required by a number of
countries such as France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and Chile; (3)
the need for the husband's authorization, which was dependent upon
the matrimonial regime between the spouses, was in force in the
Germanic laws of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland; (4) absolute independence of women was recognized from the beginning of the century
in Russia, England, and in most North American states. Based on subsequent reforms, the following examination of a selection of the most
important national laws which relate to those of Spain can be offered.
In France, the Napoleonic antifeminism incorporated into the Code
civil has now been eliminated in our neighboring country. The change
in legal attitude began with Law of February 28, 1938 and, most importantly, in those of September 22, 1942 and July 13, 1956, this being
in addition to the constitutional texts of 1946 and 1958. The following
legislative milestones can also be pointed out. Under the Law of July
13, 1907, the French wife no longer needed her husband's authorization to sell or donate any income or property she might acquire with
her earnings. As a result of the Law of August 10, 1927, a wife could
no longer lose her nationality by reason of marriage, and by the Law
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of February 18, 1938, a wife was granted in full civil capacity to contract and appear in court without her husband's authorization. This
profoundly revised marital power and, since it recognized the unity
of the family community and the the cooperation of the spouses, it
clearly limited the ability of the family head to act purely in his own
interest. It permitted a wife recourse to a judge if her husband
unilaterally decided on the family domicile and eliminated the former
obligation of the wife to obey her husband. Since French legislation
at that time still retained anachronisms, according to some scholars,
an avant-projet was drawn up by the commission to reform the Code
civil. The main goal was to reorganize the family so as to achieve
modern equality of men and women, social equality -education, sports,
art-and economic equality- professions and salaries instead of income
by dowry-avoiding thereby a titular family head and the designation of the domicile by the husband. The judge was to resolve any
conflicts, as had been prescribed by the law enacted in 1942. Although
this avant-projet was never promulgated, the Law of July 13, 1965
included the majority of its postulates, especially in regard to the
wife's equality regardless of the matrimonial regime in effect during
the marriage.
In Italy, the Law of July 17, 1919 had already abolished the need
for the husband's authorization in order for the wife to act. Then,
in the Italian constitution of December 27, 1947 the principle of legal
equality of the spouses was proclaimed, although it was quite some
time before legislation to this effect appeared in the Italian Civil Code.
The reform of the latter in matters of family law was approved by
the Chamber of Deputies on December 1, 1971. After many parliamentary discussions, Law 151 of May 19, 1975 was passed, which sanctions the egalitarian principle found in the 1947 constitution, establishes conjoint authority over children, and requires that in cases of
conflict a court decision must be sought.
In spite of the recent approval of the Portuguese Civil Code by
the Law of November 25, 1966, the obsolete dogma of the husband's
authority is maintained. Its importance, however, is being revised in
order to permit wives some freedom to act. Examples of this are her
coparticipation in the domestic decisions within the home and the
possibility of her having an independent profession. Other examples
result from Decree No. 261/75 of May 27, 1975, which maintains an
air of progressiveness with regard to women's liberation.
The Constitution of the German Federal Republic of 1949 includes
the principle of legal equality of husband and wife, and therefore the
so-called Bonner Grundgesetz, the Law of May 23, 1949, abolishes the
husband's right to decide upon the domicile and the wife's obligation
to accept his choice. The Law of June 18, 1957 established legal equali-
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ty for the sexes and served as a model for other countries. It granted
conjoint authority over children and the wife's right to have recourse
to the Judge of Tutorships in order to resolve any conflicts.
In the matter of legal equalization of the sexes, not only the
U.S.S.R., but its satellites as well, were model examples, for it should
not be forgotten that women in those countries constitute a .work force
equal to that of men and that they participate with equal force in
technological and social development. Their maternal and domestic
chores have been reduced by a system of family planning. The ironcurtain countries, since their revolutionary beginnings, have attempted
through legislation to demolish the classical family unit. An effort has
been made to do away with marriage and even with paternal authority
within the family. Nonetheless, those criteria are tempered in the legal
texts, and the Russian Civil Code of 1918 establishes that family
authority, rights, and duties shall be exercised jointly by both parents
and, specifically in the constitution of 1936, it is solemnly declared
that "women have the same rights as men in all aspects of life." As
has been noted, this spirit and development permeates the other codes
within the realm of Russia's political influence.
It can be observed, then, that the duality evident in comparative
law generally also exists in the countries just discussed: the recognition of the principles of legal equality of the sexes and its practical
applications vary from country to country and among the particular
institutions in which it operates.
Spanish Civil Law
Law prior to the revision of the Civil Code. Concerning Spanish
legal history, it has been said, in effect, that the status of women
in our ancient law followed an evolution parallel to that of the other
European, Latin, and Germanic countries. The slow but constant effect of Christian ideas, the strengthening of public authority which
made it possible for the state to protect the weak, and the institution
of Justinian law with its favorable attitude toward the economic independence of women contributed to reducing the harshness of the
social and legal condition of women. But no uniformity existed in the
treatment of women by the various regional fueros, for, as Professor
De Castro points out, alongside dispositions which presupposed full
capacity for married women there existed others which denied such
capacity to her, especially in order to free the husband of responsibility for the actions of his wife. In the law prior to the enactment
of the C6digo civil women were still denied the exercise of their
political rights and, as a general rule, their aptitude for carrying out
public offices, and even for carrying out acts of a private, civil nature,
were subject to important limitations such as the following:
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1. They were unable to be guardians, except in the case of
a grandmother with respect to her grandchildren;
2. They were unable to exercise authority over their
children, except in the absence of the father;
3. They were unable to serve as witnesses for wills, except
in times of disaster, or to adopt children, except in the
case of a woman who lost her son while he was defending his country;
4. They were unable to serve as sureties for their husbands
or anyone else, except in exceptional cases;
5. Married women were unable to effect any juridical act inter vivos without their husband's consent or, absent that,
without the consent of a judge.
In order to determine what effect the Spanish Civil Code in force
in 1889 had on this problem and to glean whether or not it advanced
the status of women in our legal system, one must in principle look
to the historical antecedents -basically the Leyes de Toro and various
scattered territoral laws, or fueros-and the decisive influence of the
French codification movement (which proved very unpromising). For
instance, Cortezo has noted, quite accurately, that the Spanish code
continued the incapacities and limitations of the "Leyes de Toro and
the entire antifeminist spirit of the Napoleonic Code, and, according
to Professor Castin, there still subsisted in our first civil code a
limitation upon the capacity of the married woman to take any kind
of financial action. The differentiating criteria for men and women
within the 1889 Civil Code can be seen in the following groups of
norms in which a discriminatory stamp is evident, but which can be
established without prejudice to the original reasons that the
legislators might have had for their establishment.
Limitations by reason of sex. Professor De Castro classified the
Civil Code precepts, prior to the successive reforms of recent years,
that revealed the legal inequality of the sexes. He called his criteria
"dispositions based on the different physical constitutions of men and
women." He pointed out: (1) those provisions relative to the age at
which one could contract a civil marriage, being twelve years for
women and fourteen for men (art. 83-1); (2) the disposition which imposed upon a widow the limitations that prohibited her from remarrying for 301 days following the death of her husband or prior to
giving birth, if she was pregnant at the time of his death, and the
disposition which imposed the same restriction upon a woman whose
marriage had been anulled, beginning from the moment of her legal
separation (art. 45-2); (3) the precepts which regulated the causes for
divorce (art. 105-3, 105-4) that, according to De Castro, clearly established an unjustified difference in relation to adultery.
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It will be recalled from the previous discussion concerning the
physiological differences between the sexes that real differences in
their very nature do exist, while other differences exist in popular
belief only. On the other hand, in the discussions of family and
sociological matters it was clear that, merely because women could
bear children, there evolved a series of unjustified demands upon
women. Those expectations condemned any sexual transgressions on
a woman's part with much more severity than if a man had been the
perpetrator.
The differing age at which men and women could marry (art. 83-1)
without a doubt evolved from the well-known fact that females reach
sexual maturity much earlier than males. This legal distinction cannot be condemned, since the biological difference is indisputable. The
regulations found in article 45-2, concerning the restrictions upon
remarriage by a widow or a woman whose marriage had been annulled,
result from biological differences as well, since absent the resriction,
circumstances could prevent any certainty as to which man was the
true father of a subsequently born child. For example, if a widow marries before 301 days have passed since her first husband died, or if
a woman marries before that many days have passed since the annullment of her marriage, it is quite probable that those women would
have had sexual relations with both their first and second husbands
during the period of gestation. Thus the 301-day prohibition on remarriage was an attempt to prevent confusion as to the true father. The
degrading nature of the discriminatory treatment regarding adultery
as a ground for divorce under article 105-1, which provided that
"adultery on the part of a wife in any case and on the part of the
husband if a public scandal or disdain for the wife should result," has
already been noted. This provision was eliminated by the Law of April
24, 1958, but until then it was a viable example of legal discrimination. Under article 45-3 another ground for divorce was based on the
"violence of the husband toward his wife to force her to change
religion." Apart from the unusual goal of such force, this regulation
is of interest as an indication of the superior strength of men-which
has not been questioned-and which allows them to act in a violent
manner with women as their victims.
In regard to the social or moral sphere, the restrictions on women
based upon a hesitancy to grant them capacity in the first few years
of their majority have been discussed. Article 321, after its revision
by Law 20 passed in December of 1952, stated that:
[A] daughter who has reached majority but is under 25 cannot
leave home without her father or mother's permission. She shall
live in her parents' company until reaching the age of 25 except
if she leaves to marry or to enter an institute approved by the
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church, or if her father or mother should later remarry or there
should be some other reason to justify the separation.
Prior to this change in 1952, the content of this law was even stricter,
for it stated: "In spite of what is stated in the previous article regarding majority, daughters who have reached their majority but who are
younger than 25 cannot leave their parents' house without permission of the father or mother in whose company they live unless it
is to marry, to enter the church, or if the father or mother has remarried." De Castro has described this as "legal hesitancy" to concede
complete autonomy to women. The reason for this is precisely because
of the weight of those social and family conditions that not only judged
her conduct with special severity but also subjected her to more family
authority, and therefore granted her less liberty, than a male child
under the same circumstances. It is curious that an ancient example
of paternalism, which remained in force until 1952, should annull the
clearest sign of majority: the granting of independence to a person
who has reached majority, even if the person possesses the ability
to work and to provide for himself. But, even in view of this fact,
what was even more important or discriminatory was the fear that
the single woman would face great danger to her moral uprightness
if she were allowed to live alone outside the home before the age
of twenty-five. It should not be forgotten that she was allowed to
live outside the family domicile only to marry, to become a nun, or
if her father or mother remarried. Under the latter circumstances,
it was thought that the family atmosphere might not be adequate for
forced living under the same roof. Finally, in the reform of 1952, more
flexible and progressive criteria fell under the category of "any other
reason that would justify" the daughter's leaving the home, such as
financial independence because of employment.
In terms of the family, De Castro speaks about two different
groups. The first is referred to as "regulations having the character
of a privilege for women," relative to the establishment of an
obligatory dowry for daughters, except in cases where the daughters
marry without first obtaining the required consent under article 1340.
The second is referred to as "limitations related to a woman who marries for the second time." The sanctions resulting from a second marriage can be either the loss of authority over the children from the
first marriage, except when that occurrence has been foreseen by the
father according to article 168, or the ability of a widow who remarries
to name a testamentary tutor for her children without the approval
of the family council, according to article 206.
Considering the attitude of the nineteenth-century Spanish
legislator, these regulations must have had only one explanation: the
dowry, because daughters who married according the dictates or
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advice of the family benefited from it. Also, the restrictions upon a
widow who remarried can be explained by the idea that her action
denoted a lack of respect for her dead spouse, who could so quickly
be replaced in her affections, or by the view that she was not deemed
to have the necessary qualities or adequate competence to be a guardian of the children. In reality, the discriminatory element was clear.
In the case of a dowry, apart from its being an unrealistic institution
that remained in our Civil Code until the recent revision of the Law
of May 13, 1981, even though it was an apparent plus for a woman,
and one certainly not available to her brothers, in truth it favored
the future husband, for his wife thus brought to the marriage an
economic tool of appreciable benefit.
Among the historical factors contributing to male primacy, one
finds included the ancient prohibitions based on the archaic principle
that men are the only ones who can carry out public functions. In
this respect, reference is made to the remanents of the public character that testaments and the exercise of tutorship had under ancient
Roman law, as a consequence of which two particular prohibitions persisted in the Spanish Civil Code. In the first place, a woman could
not be a witness to a will, under article 681, except during a time
of epidemic, in which event she was permitted to be a witness if she
was at least sixteen years old, in accordance with article 601. Secondly,
a woman could not be a tutor, undertutor, or member of the family
council, as provided in articles 237-7 and 298, with the exception that
a woman could be called in the case of a legal tutorship if she was
a grandmother, spouse, mother, or sister of the ward under articles
220, 221, 227, and 230. In addition, vestiges of ancient distinctions
originating in the area of public law existed among the laws governing
the inheritance of noble titles. Generally, a woman was limited in this
area because preference was given to male children.
Apart from the consideration of nobility, which actually is not a
part of the present study, since the topic falls under the realm of
administrative law, the limitations described can have no explanation
other than the weight of historical legacy. Although those limitations
have now disappeared, one can note that the conscious influence of
Roman law existed until recent times in our country, as the regulation regarding the witnessing of wills by women remained in force
until 1975.
Limitations by reasons of marriage.In the previous discussion of
the family, it was pointed out that, in addition to the traditional limitations placed upon women because of their sex, there is another incapacity which is imposed by reason of marriage. When she marries, a
woman simply goes from the domination of the family to that of the
husband. The regulations in force in the Spanish Civil Code until the
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Law of April 24, 1958 were eloquent in terms of the degrading effects of matrimony on the capacity of the married woman. These effects can be summarized according to three groups: the personal, financial, and filial spheres.
Until its revision, article 57 established that "the husband must
protect his wife, and the latter must obey her husband." Such protection and obediance naturally tend to create a family head and a subbordinate companion. Article 58 stated that the "wife is obliged to
follow her husband wherever he should choose to reside. Nevertheless,
courts shall, with just cause, be empowered with the right to exempt
her from this obligation if her husband should move abroad." This
clearly gave the power of choosing a domicile to the husband. Article
56 stated that: "The wife shall enjoy the honors to which her husband is entitled except those which are exclusively personal, and she
shall retain them as long as she does not remarry." This was a
unilateral privilege accorded to the wife, which includes an implication that if she should forget her deceased husband she could no longer
participate in those honors.
The subordination of the wife to the husband within the financial
sphere was total until the revisions instituted in the Law of April
24, 1958. The mainifestation of this situation can be seen principally
in former articles 60, 61, 62, 65, and 59. Article 60 provided: "The
husband is the representative of his wife. Without his permission she
cannot appear in court on her own behalf or through an attorney."
This incapacity was of a personal nature, since the husband represented his wife even if she was destitute or totally under his domination. Article 61 stated: "Neither can a wife purchase property even
for profit, sell her property, or incur debts, without the husband's
permission except in cases permitted by law and with established
limitations." Her financial submission to her husband was absolute,
and any infractions were punished under article 62, which provided:
Those acts executed against the disposition in the previous regulations are null and void except if it is a question of purchases for
the ordinary use of the family, in which case purchases made by
a wife are valid. Any purchase of jewelry, furniture or precious
objects made without the husband's permission are valid only if
he has consented to the use and enjoyment of such objects.
The primacy of the husband and the lesser importance of the wife,
as well as the exception which has. been previously referred as "the
domestic power of the married woman," are evident in article 65, which
provided: "Only her husband and her heirs can, proclaim null and void
any acts carried out or permitted by a wife without the necessary
permission and authorization." Here, the wife's domestic power was
very limited, since any possible flexibility depended on the good-will
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of her husband. Article 59 provided: "The husband is the administrator
of the community property except as stipulated to the contrary in
Article 3182." The regulation is clearly prejudicial to married women.
Furthermore, article 1413 elevated this regulation to the level of complete male supremacy, for a husband could do anything he wished
with the community property, including selling or mortgaging it. The
interest of the wife or her heirs were only contemplated when the
husband had committed fraud or had broken the law. And, article
1263-3 prevented the married woman from making contracts, so that
her capacity to act was quite minimal.
The authority of the husband was also clearly supreme in the filial
area under the old regime. Article 154 provided in part that the
"father, and in his absence the mother, have power over their children." Clearly there is in this article preferential treatment for the
father. Prior to the revision of 1958, article 206 required the approval
of the family council before a testamentary tutor could be designated
by a mother who had married for a second time. The delegation of
legal tutorship in articles 211, 220-2, 227-1, and 230, the prohibitions
on being a tutor under article 237-7, and the requirements for the
composition of the family council in article 294 are examples that
reveal a clear preference for the husband over his wife.
Many of these requirements were not revised by the law passed
in 1958, nor by that passed in 1975. Because such revision was not
accomplished until the recent Law of May 13, 1981, it is clear that
in the legislative mind these preferences resulted from a history of
male preeminence. None of these deficient legal norms reflected even
the slightest degree of legal equality between men and women,
whether the woman was married or not.
Civil Code Revisions Concerning Legal Discrimination
The actual discrimination suffered by women can be easily
understood in light of the foregoing analysis. It should also be clear
what the response of our government must have been with regard
to the previously mentioned United Nations Subcommission recommendations. But, let us now turn to the three revisions which dismanteled the archaic discriminatory patterns within the law.Law of April 24, 1958. The principal goal of this law was not to
alter the legal position of women. Indeed, in its Expos4 de motifs the
following is found: "The present modification of the Civil Code, the
most extensive of those introduced up to now, affects primarily the
matrimonial regime, in order to accomodate the Concordat of August
27, 1953 between the Holy See and the Spanish State... and it deals
with the problem of the legal capacity of women, a problem which
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has existed for some time." Thus, one finds that the primary motivation for these changes was to conform Spanish positive law to the
Concordat. The egalitarian manisfestations of this law are evident in
other statements from its Expose de motifs as well, some of which
are discussed below.
Concerning the legal differences between men and women by
reason of sex, the following quotation is instructive. "In terms of the
legal capacity of women in general the present law derives its inspiration from the principle that both in the natural and social order of
things, sex in and of itself cannot determine a difference in treatment within the civil law, which cannot be translated in any way into
a limitation upon women in the area of legal relations." Under this
law, however, that egalitarian statement does not find complete normative reflection, since its expression is found only in regard to the
law's recognition of women as having the capacity to witness wills
and to serve as tutors. Also, despite the proclamation of the goal of
dignifying women, the following pronouncements clearly carry discriminatory weight. Although it is maintained that the family is the most
intimate and essential social institution, the law states that the family "cannot be the cause of inequities, but there -are certain institutional differences derived from the duties which its members are
obligated to perform in order to achieve better the moral and social
goals which, according to natural law, it is designed to fulfill." In other
words, even if marital and family status do not cause inequities, they
are nonetheless the cause of organizational differences, that is, differences derived from the structure of the family as a result of the
distinctive duties of husband and wife, for example, there is a difference in the secular weight accorded to the roles which each must
perform, one being social and external, and the other being domestic
and internal. The law further states that: "The peculiar position of
the married woman in the conjugal relationship in which, because of
the exigencies of matrimonial unity, there exists a power of direction
which nature, religion and history attribute to the husband." Criticism
of this statement cannot be, nor should it be, based on ethical or discretionary grounds, because its very context prevents that; and, the
drafters themselves, several years later of course, became quite
disturbed about the statement.
The Exposg de motifs further states: "One contemplates . . .the
peculiar position of the married woman within a regime in which the
feeling of the Catholic tradition has always inspired and ought to inspire in the future the relations between the spouses." There cannot
be a more inopportune affirmation, nor a greater hodgepodge of institutions, than this. One must also be prudent in his criticism, because
a jurist must not take advantage of hindsight, keeping in mind that
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the law was enacted in 1958, a time when political authority was invading the parimeters of the law in Spain and when Catholicism was
unfortunately allied with ideological positions which were actually incompatible with it. Concerning marital authority, the law states:
"Because the principle of marital authority demands that it be so,"
the husband's permission is necessary in order for the wife to act.
Thus, the idea of the husband as head of the household is sanctioned,
and its most characteristic and odious features are maintained-the
need for a wife's actions to be authorized in order to be valid.
Law of May 2, 1975. Until the promulgation of this new and so
eagerly awaited law, there had actually been no profound alterations
in the existing laws in this area. Although as a result of the 1975
law equality finally penetrated our legislative framework, as in all
human endeavors, there were a few remaining examples of the old
attitudes. Those have apparently been eliminated by the 1981 changes,
as a result of criticism by feminists and certain jurists.
The Exposd de motifs of the 1975 law reveals its goal of complete
equality in the following statement:
One of the most strongly felt currents of thought in our time in
the area of private law, a reflection of authentic needs of a pressing nature, is that which deals with the legal status of married
women. They endure limitations upon their capacity to act which,
if in earlier times might have had an explanation, have not lost
it. Since this is the case, new legislation has resulted.
From the Exposi de motifs the following manifestations of the
egalitarian principle can be derived.
In the first place, marriage no longer in and of itself automatically
affects the acquisition, loss, or recovery of Spanish nationality,
although such changes can be effected voluntarily at the wife's discretion. The discriminatory formula in article 57, which attributed protection to the husband and required obedience of the wife, has been
eliminated. Now absolute reciprocity is expected. Husband and wife
must be mutually protective and must always act in the interest of
the family. The change in article 58 grants equal participation to the
wife in determining the place of residence.
Marriage no longer implies a restriction with respect to the capacity of the spouses to work. Therefore, neither spouse can boast of
having the power of legal representation over the other, except when
the latter so chooses. In addition, each spouse can carry out certain
juridical acts and exercise the private or exclusive rights to which
he or she is entitled. In article 65 it is explained that in a case where
the consent of both spouses is required for a particular transaction,
if the consent of one of the spouses is lacking and if that spouse has
not ratified the transaction, it can be annulled.
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Under article 66 the domestic authority within the family is ex..
plained in such a manner that for those acts and contracts which relate
to ordinary necessities of the family both spouses are fully permitted
and required to act. In article 68-4 it is established that during the
course of an anullment or separation proceedings the administration
of the community property may be carried out by either the husband
or the wife. Article 237, which prevented a woman from being a tutor
or undertutor, has been modified, and as a logical consequence, the
exception imposed upon women in all cases has been eliminated accord.
ing to article 244. The following instances in which a wife needed her
husband's permission or authorization to act have been eliminated:
article 893 has been amended so that a wife can be an executrix; article 995 has been amended so that she can accept or refuse an inheritance; and, article 1053 has been amended so that she can request
a partition of such inheritance. The discrimination contained in former
article 1263-3, by which a married woman could not give valid consent in certain cases established by law (a true incapacity to contract),
an archaic section which included women among those who physically
or mentally lack the normal requirements for capacity, has been
eliminated.
Concerning matters relating to finances within the marriage, the
following manifestations of the goal of equality between husband and
wife can be observed. In reference to the paraphenalia, or her separate
property, the wife can now dispose of this property of her own accord,
she can appear in court in order to litigate with respect to it, and
her husband can act in regard to the property only as her agent. Articles 1389 and 1391 have been modified to the extent that, if a wife
assigns the administration of her separate property over to her husband, such an assignment must be in writing and included in the marriage contract, and in default of this, the rules governing mandate
will be applied and will likewise govern the restitution of her separate
property administered by the husband. Concerning the dissolution of
the community at the time of a legal separation between the spouses,
the contradiction found in former articles 73 and 1433 has been resolved by the provision that, when a final judgment of separation has
been obtained, either of the spouses, whether that spouse was or was
not at fault in causing the separation, is entitled by law to demand
a separation of property. Once such a separation has been completed,
each spouse acquires full ownership of whatever property was ajudicated to him or her as a consequence of the dissolution of the marriage. If the separation is based upon the interdiction or absence of
one of the spouses, the administration and dispoition of the property
adjudicated to the interdicted or absent spouse shall go to his or her
curator or legal representative in accordance with the specific provisions governing this matter.
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With regard to a woman's administration of the property, a distinction is made between the automatic grant of such power, as when
a wife is her husband's curator, when a petition has been made for
a declaration of his absence, or when he has been declared a fugitive
or rebel under article 1441, and the judicial grant of such power, as
when the husband has abandoned the family or is prevented from
administering the property. By virtue of article 1442 the same powers
that fall to the husband when it is he who exercises such administration are also conferred upon the wife. In regard to the wife's disposing
of property that belongs to the couple, when she is the administrator
in the instances mentioned above, and since the property referred
to must be understood as community property, and, further, in keeping with the goal of equalizing the rights of husbands and wives, it
has been provided that the wife is granted the same power to dispose
of property as that granted the husband under article 1413 and, conversely, it has been provided that the wife is subject to the same
requirement of procuring judicial authorization for the disposition of
immovables and business establishments just as her husband would be.
With respect to actions by married women in the commercial
world, there are three examples of instances where they have been
put on equal footing with their husbands. When doubts or conflicts
arise in the management of a business by a married woman or by
her spouse, those doubts or conflicts must be resolved by referring
to the express agreement contained within their marriage contract.
If no such agreement was entered into, articles 4 to 11 of the Commerical Code governing the management of a business by either
spouse must control. In all cases, the archaic requirement of the husband's permission in order for the wife to engage in business has been
eliminated.
Jurists were quick to comment upon this Law of May 2, 1975,
and it has been the subject of innumerable works. The reactions were
generally quite favorable. The analogy made by Professor Antonio
Hernandez-Gil in speaking before the Institute for Legal Studies is
illustrative: "Ihave complete confidence that just as the date of May
2 signifies independence in our country, this law, which bears the same
date, will represent independence for women." Without giving consideration to the marginal technical aspects of the revision, a subject
that should be dealt with in a more scientific study, it is this writer's
opinion that the law has been positive and favorable with respect to
the general phenomenon of sex discrimination within the law. With
this revision, Spain truly joined the women's liberation movement
which had existed in the civilized world for some time. There were,
however, valid accusations that two instances of discrimination still
remained after the promulgation of the 1975 law-the supremacy of
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the husband in matters of authority over the children and the administration of community property. Although such discrimination was
finally eliminated with the recent revisions in 1981, it would appear
that it was not dealt with under the 1975 law because of the difficulties
that can arise in exercising such authority and administration.
Laws of May 13, 1981 and July 7, 1981. The projection of the reformist impetus, at times excessively progressive, which the new political
situation in Spain has produced cannot be ignored as it relates to the
law and, in particular, to legislation concerning the family in its most
obvious aspects: filiation, authority over children, and administration
of the economic regime of the marriage, as well as the cause for annullment, separation, and divorce. The first three areas were the object of the Law of May 13, 1981, and the three remaining, that of
the most recent Law of July 7, 1981, the so-called "divorce law." But,
just as the latter, which convulsed the secular system of the indissolubility of marriage, was born in an atmosphere of intense controversy,
the former, in spite of its decisive importance and far-reaching repruccusions in the area of family law, did not cause the same biligerance
in parliamentary discussion, nor did it, once promulgated, at least up
to the present, provoke such wide publicity or treatment by jurists.
Restricting the examination of the Law of May 13, 1981 to the
well-known area of the interrelationships of the married couple, it can
be expected that with this law the last vestiges of discriminatory treatment for women will disappear. This was the goal which inspired the
law, as is clear from its Expose de motifs, which the government sent
to the Congress of Deputies, but which was not published when the
law was promulgated, a fact which has no precedent in our legislation. With this law, and that of July 7, 1981, equalization of the rights
and duties of the sexes is a definite reality in Spain. In fact, if one
recalls that, basically, the discriminatory residue which existed in our
laws was limited to the areas of the ages which had to be attained
before marriage, the maintenance of an obligatory dowry for
daughters, the preference for males over females in the exercise of
certain responsibilities, the grant of the administration of the community property to the husband, and preference for the husband in
the grant of authority over the children, the new regime removes
these discriminatory regulations in the following ways.
Significant improvements in alleviating discrimination by reason
of sex were accomplished by the Laws of May 13, 1981 and July 7,
1981. The latter was most important in regard to legal discrimination
based upon the physicological differences between the sexes. The Law
of May 2, 1975, maintained only the provision that the age for marriage was different for men and women, according to article 83-1. The
Law of May 13, 1981 made no change in this regard, but under the
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Law of July 7, 1981, current article 46 states that non-emancipated
minors may not marry and current article 48 states that "in decisions
regarding the age of the minor ... his/her parents or guardians" must
be heard and that treatment should not vary according to sex. As
a radical change with respect to family factors giving rise to the legal
discrimination, the Law of May 13 eliminated the dowry. The reasons
for this are clearly expressed in the Exposg de motifs: "The Code
prescribed so many and such extensive precepts for the dowry, not
because it was customary at the time the Code was drafted, but
because such precepts constituted the general status of all private
property of any married woman under any regime. However, these
goals were no longer of use when the Code was promulgated." One
may add, also, the recognition of the fact that., among others, the
dowry was a fossilized institution. The preferences for males over
females in regard to carrying out certain responsibilities were also
eliminated. In article 4 of the Law of May 13, 1981, it is prescribed
that certain articles of the Civil Code are to be changed as follows:
(1) article 184 now reads in part, "representation of one who has been
declared absent is entrusted to the oldest son; and if there are several,
those who were living with the absent party and the oldest shall have
preference;" article 211 now reads in part, "Legal tutorship .. .is
entrusted to: First-to the youngest grandparent;" article 220 reads
in part: "Tutorship of the demented or deaf mutes is entrusted: ...
Second to the father and mother .. .third to the children;" and article 227 reads in part: "Tutorship of prodigal children is entrusted:
...First to the father and mother-. . . Second to the youngest grandparent ...Third to the oldest of the other siblings." Finally, for some
incomprehensible reason, except perhaps as a result of a simple oversight, current article 295 has not been revised. That article, as
amended by the Law of April 24, 1958, maintains that: "For the Family
Council the closest relative will have preference over the most distant,
and if there is a choice of two equally close or distant relatives, a
man will have preference over a woman.... (Emphasis added.)
In regard to legal discrimination by reason of marriage, two
vestiges remained in the law: the exclusive grant to the husband of
the administration of the community property and the authority over
non-emancipatd children. Both of these were eliminated under the
Laws of May 13, 1981 and July 7, 1981. The revisions effected by
the Law of May 2, 1975 had already eliminated several instances of
legal discrimination, particularly in regard to articles 57, 58, and 64,
as discussed earlier. In consonance with the goal of total equality of
the spouses, the Law of July 7, 1981 made the following significant
amendments. New article 66 provides: "The husband and wife are
equal in rights and duties." This is a fundamental rule which replaces
prior article 62, which stated: "Marriage does not restrict the capacity
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to act of either spouse." Thus, new article 66 is more categorical and
precise. New article 67 states: "The husband and wife must respect
each other and act in the interest of the family." This replaces former
article 57 which, in its 1975 version, eliminated the wife's duty to
obey. Now neither spouse receives protection, and, instead, they must
aid and respect each other, nothing more. New article 70 provides:
"The spouses will agree on their domicile, and in case of disagreement, a judge will resolve the situation, keeping in mind the best
interests of the family." With this new text, the contradiction in former
article 58 is corrected, for there it was stated that the father, as the
parent having authority over the children, had the sole power to decide
on the place of domicile. Article 64 concerning shared honors has been
repealed, since it was deemed to have minimal practical meaning.
Marital infidelity as a cause for separation, which had been equalized in terms of legal treatment of the sexes in the revision of April
24, 1958, reappears in 1981, but no longer as related to adultery. In
articles 85 el seq. infidelity appears as a ground for divorce. Thus,
article 82 provides: "Causes for separation are: the unjustified abandonment of the home, conjugal infedelity injurious conduct, or any
other serious or repeated violation of conjugal duties." In addition
to this explicit use of "conjugal infidelity," an adjustment in article
82 and prior article 105 demonstrates that the causes for separation
in former article 105-4 ("an attempt on the part of the husband to
prostitute his wife") and former article 105-5 ("an attempt on the part
of the husband or wife to corrupt their children or prostitute their
daughters") have been eliminated. Although these provisions were not
previously discussed, those causes contained a difference in the treatment of men and women in a sexual context which today would have
no valid justification.
As a consequence of the provision in new article 66 that the husband and wife have equal rights and duties, new article 71 reflects
the same tenor of prior article 63, which provided: "Neither spouse
can take it upon himself/herself to represent the other unless this
right has been conferred." There are, however, two pervasive revisions
with respect to the economic sphere of marriage. The consecration
of the principle of conjoint management, concerning the administration
and disposition of community property, is prescribed by new article
1375 in the following terms: "In the absence of a martial contract,
the management and disposition of community property is the joint
responsibility of the spouses, in conformity with the following articles."
Thus, an ancient stigma which had been maintained under previous
revisions and which was repeatedly denounced by feminist groups has
finally been eliminated. The complete financial autonomy of the
spouses, and their capacity to carry out any kind of contract, is
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definitely recognized in new article 1323: "The husband and wife may
exchange between themselves, with any kind of title, any property
and/or rights and may make between themselves any kind of contract."
The Law of May 13 also made important changes with respect to the
spouses' financial contributions to the family and the economic value
of the wife's domestic tasks. As amended by that law, article 1438
regulating the regime of separation of property now provides:
T]he spouses shall contribute to the fulfillment of the responsibilities of the marriage. If there is no written agreement, the
contribution of each shall be proportional to his or her financial
resources. Housework shall be considered a contribution to the
duties of the marriage and shall entitle the performer of the work
to compensation which shall be indicated by the Judge. In case
an agreement cannot be reached the regime of separation shall
be eliminated.
This rule is equally applicable to the so-called regime of participation, according to article 1413, but not to the community property
regime.
With the elimination of preferences for the husband over the wife
and for the man over the woman in carrying out certain duties, the
revision also eliminates the archaic Roman system of authority over
children and proclaims the principles of joint authority and joint exercise of its function as revealed in the following two articles. Article
154 provides: "Non-emancipated children are under the power of the
father and the mother." In addition, article 1546 states: "Authority
over the children shall be exercised by both parents or by only one
with the express or tacit consent of the other." Aside from the fact
that difficulties and problems may arise in regard to the practical application of the new laws, in terms of equalization of the rights and
duties of the sexes, there is no doubt that full legal equality of the
sexes and of the spouses has been achieved. In this way, Spain definitely joins the long list of civilized countries where women have been
liberated from all servitude to men.
Miscellaneous enactments concerning employment and the political'
and public activities of women. In order to complete the portrait of
women's social opportunities in Spain, it is appropriate to examine
the status of women in the areas of employment, politics, and public
administration in light of the regulations currently in force. As discussed earlier, the Law of May 2, 1975 treats the activities of women
within the commercial sphere, applying three egalitarian principles:
(1) in order to resolve doubts or conflicts in the exercise of a business
by a married woman, or by either spouse, one must have recourse
to the agreement contained in the marital contract; (2) if there is no
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such agreement, articles 4 to 11 of the Commerical Code will govern
in that which relates to the exercise of a business by either of the
spouses; (3) in all cases, the husband's permission in order for his wife
to engage in business is eliminated. In addition to that law, in matters of employment, politics, and public life, the applicable laws began
with those of June 22, 1961 and December 28, 1966 and culminated
with the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Labor Statute of March
10, 1980.
The Law of June 22, 1961, as a result of the partial equalization
in the Law of April 24, 1958 and in the provisions of articles 11 and
24 of the Fuero de los Espaioles, affirmed in article 1 that "the law
recognizes for women the same rights that men have in carrying out
any kind of political, professional or work activities, without any limitations except those established in the present law." Excluded from this
principle was participation in administrative bodies and the armed
forces. Subsequently, however, the Law of December 28, 1966 eliminated the first exception, so that women can now be judges, magistrates, or district attorneys.
The principle of equality is categorically stated in article 14 of
the Spanish constitution of 1978: "Spaniards are equal before the law.
There can be no discrimination because of birth, race, sex, religion,
opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance."
In this regard, there are two significant provisions in the Labor
Statute of March 10,1980. Article 17 of that law provides: "Regulatory
precepts, clauses contained in collective agreements, individual pacts
and unilateral decisions by a manager that contain discrimination
because of age, favorable or unfavorable discrimination employment,
compensation, working hours or any other working condition, discrimination because of sex, origin, civil status, race, social condition . . .
shall be null and without effect." Likewise, article 28 provides: "The
employer is obligated to pay an equal salary for equal work, with
respect to salaries, as well as raises, without discrimination on the
basis of sex."
CONCLUSIONS AND THE EGALITARIAN OBJECTIVE

No longer is there discrimination against women in the written
laws of Spain. Just as men, women can now engage in political activity,
carry out any public responsibilities, except within the armed forces,
carry out any business or commerical activities, engage in work for
someone else, and exercise equal rights and responsibilities, whether
she is married or single. In the latter instance this is true, if she
is single, because her legal position is the same as that of a man,
and if she is married, because within the personal sphere she occupies
an identical position of respect and reciprocal assistance with her hus-

19821

NEW ROLE of WOMEN

1569

band and because, in the financial sphere, she enjoys the same powers
of administration and disposition of property, whether it be separate
or community, and because, in the filial sphere, she is the co-holder
of authority over the children. As a final example of the equality of
men and women before the law, even though it may seem of secondary importance, article 109 of the Civil Code now provides that upon
reaching majority a child may petition the court to alter the order
of his/her surnames, thus permitting the elimination of the traditional
preference of the paternal surname over the maternal one.
The problem between the reality of the principle of legal equality
for women and its practical observance by the "male powers" was
suggested sometime ago by Simone de Beauvoir. She queried whether
it is sufficient merely for the laws to change so that women can in
reality achieve equality with men. In addition to the practical implications of that query, one may also include an examination of how the
family, as a spontaneous self-regulator, and the law, as a resolver of
conflicts in both special and non-exceptional situations, bear upon the
effectiveness of the elimination of legal discrimination by reason of
sex or marriage.
The legal equality of the sexes and the resulting lack of discrimination by reason of sex or marriage is a goal now achieved by women.
It must not nearly prevail in the law as a formal truth, but it must
also be felt as a material truth and become operative in the real world,
society, and the family. In the face of this objective, any attempts
to oppose the practical application of the new regulations will be
resisted, whether those attempts stem from the carry-over of an historical or cultural legacy or from the intervention of masculine power,
the way a family functions, or perhaps from the co-management of
marital affairs. One must be wary of such obstacles in order to prevent them from having an effect. Although each family possesses an
immense source of spontaneous self-regulation, whereby adequate solutions are arrived at for the daily conflicts which arise, there should
exist some coordination so that the family's own internal methods do
not conflict with legal precepts that now impose legal equality of the
sexes. Such coordination must be based upon two factors: the identification of the need involved and its appreciation.
The need is for the legal framework to influence the family's
methods of self-regulation so that those methods come as close as possible to the egalitarian principle proclaimed by the law. Thus, the different roles of husband and wife within the family must be adjusted
in order to balance power and omit functional subordination of the
wife. In this way, the husband will more closely approximate the "legal
husband," even though his powers are diminished, and the wife will
more nearly approximate the "legal wife," as a result of the
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strengthening of her position and the recognition of her rights. The
appreciation, or understanding, of this need may be explained in the
following way. Any demand for judicial protection by a spouse, because
he/she is dissatisfied with his/her rights or position within the family,
is not an exceptional pathology that will demolish'the family as it
is presently constituted. Rather, it is a special situation resulting from
the impossibility of resolving a conflict on the basis of the family's
methods of self-regulation. Thus, the subsequent judicial intervention
need not lead to irreconcilable differences, nor be the cause of a scandal or shameful humiliation in the face of public opinion. It is simply
an indispensable therapeautic recourse by which to treat a family illness, so that the family can proceed to live together in health and
harmony.
Unfortunately, this work must conclude by stating that, just as
the need for coordination can have a promising future, the necessity
for "appreciation" implies difficulties that are at the moment insoluble. To improve matters it will be necessary to modernize the scale
of values which restrict social units and the family by removing the
obsolete standards by which family conflicts are resolved. In any case,
this warning about the risks to be faced in applying the principle of
legal equality between the sexes should not prevent its proper 'application nor cast a shadow over the fact that today the new role
of women under the law is absolutely comparable to that of men.

